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Between Grassroots Activism and Transnational 
Aspirations: Anti-Nuclear Protest from the  
Rhine Valley to the Bundestag, 1974-1983 
Stephen Milder ∗ 
Abstract: »Zwischen Graswurzel-Aktivismus und transnationalen Bestrebun-
gen: Die Anti-Atombewegung vom Rheintal bis in den Bundestag, 1974-1983«. 
In the mid-1970s, French, German, and Swiss protesters jointly occupied the 
Wyhl nuclear reactor construction site in the Upper Rhine Valley. Even at the 
grassroots level, transnational cooperation allowed reactor opponents to trans-
cend the limits of politics-as-usual and adopt “new” protest strategies. Moreo-
ver, though it was minutely local, the Wyhl occupation had significant transna-
tional effects. Activists throughout Europe and even across the Atlantic 
considered this protest to influence the situation in their home countries. They 
were eager to build on the “example of Wyhl.” Yet, as this article shows, activ-
ists beyond the Rhine had a hard time deploying transnationalism in the mass 
anti-nuclear protests and political campaigns that followed Wyhl. The West 
German Greens’ 1979 European Parliament campaign is perhaps the best ex-
ample of the way that activists inspired by Rhenish protests continued to em-
phasize transnationalism. Despite their European outlook, however, the Greens’ 
first major political success came in Bonn, not Strasbourg. Thus, for the Greens 
and many others transnational thinking proved difficult to sustain beyond the 
grassroots level. It may have been most effective as a means of reinvigorating 
national politics. 
Keywords: Anti-nuclear movement, transnationalism, Die Grünen/West German 
Greens, environmentalism. 
1.  Introduction1  
On 18 February 1975, hundreds of rural people streamed onto the reactor con-
struction site at Wyhl in southwestern Germany. They remained on the site 
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1  I would like to thank Jan-Henrik Meyer and Astrid Mignon Kirchhof for their insightful and 
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Vargas-Tonsi and Malachi Hacohen of Duke University’s Center for European Studies, whose 
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until 20 February, when a brutal police raid forced them to disperse. Three days 
after this violent confrontation, 28,000 people from West Germany, France, 
and Switzerland pushed their way past police barricades and re-occupied the 
site. As the battle over the reactor unfolded, Strasbourg’s long-time Christian 
Democratic Mayor, Pierre Pfimlin, speculated that “the entire French nuclear 
program rides with Wyhl.” “If the nuclear plant at Wyhl is stopped,” he 
quipped, “it would be extremely difficult to put one in the Alsace. If you can’t 
do it here, where can you do it in France?”2 
Protesters, too, considered this local protest to have transnational signifi-
cance. At a speech on the occupied site, a Luxembourger exclaimed that, “the 
struggle in Wyhl is our struggle, your victory will be our victory!”3 Marie-
Reine Haug, a young Alsatian woman who played a leading role in the Wyhl 
occupation, proclaimed prophetically that, “The struggle against nuclear reac-
tors must be a chain reaction. One victory will trigger another.”4 In short, the 
remote nuclear reactor construction sites that became centers of transnational 
protest across Western Europe during the 1970s seemed to exemplify the envi-
ronmentalists’ mantra to “think globally, act locally” (Prendiville 1994, 91-3). 
Yet scholars have long struggled to understand the way that anti-reactor pro-
tests in West Germany shaped politics in France, Luxembourg, or Switzerland. 
Far from reflecting connections between these actions, literature on the anti-
nuclear movement tends to describe it as existing within isolated national boxes 
(e.g. Tourraine 1983; Radkau 1983; Paul 1997; Kupper 2003; Karapin 2007). 
The best known studies of the Wyhl protest, for example, link it solely to the 
development of anti-nuclear protest in West Germany (cf. Rucht 1980; Engels 
2006). Meanwhile, works that do address anti-nuclear protest in more than one 
country tend to compare the anti-nuclear movements of Europe with one an-
other, thus implying that they developed independently. Rather than exploring 
the connections between individual protests, such works tend to emphasize the 
specific aspects of national character and politics that have defined the move-
ment’s divergent trajectory in each state (cf. Nelkin and Pollack 1981; Joppke 
1993; Kitschelt 1983, 1984; Flam 1994; Brand 1985; Dryzek 2002; Aldrich 
2008). It was, this line of reasoning suggests, national opportunity structures 
that defined the trajectory and relative successes of anti-nuclear activism in 
each country. 
In one sense, this focus on specific nations and the different opportunities 
for anti-nuclear action within each one of them is justified. By the later seven-
ties, as police tacticians implemented new defensive measures, would-be occu-
                                                             
2  Quoted in John Vincourt. 1975. Two Rhine Villages Succeed in Halting Industrial Invasion, 
International Herald-Tribune, 5 March 1975. 
3  Helga Weber-Zucht. 1975. Wieder ein Ostermarsch – Wyhl, Infodienst für gewaltfreie 
Organisatoren 19 (March/April 1975): 3-5. 
4  Ibid. 
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piers failed even to get close to reactor construction sites. Reactor opponents 
were left searching for a new means to act. Even as occupation became untena-
ble, however, activists were shifting the focus of their attention from individual 
reactor projects to nuclear energy itself. Yet, opposing nuclear energy altogeth-
er meant working to halt nuclear programs, a project that seemed best suited to 
the political parameters of the nation-state. After all, though the European 
Communities (EC) played a certain role in the financing of reactors and sought 
to carve out its own nuclear policy in the late 1970s, as Jan-Henrik Meyer 
(2014) discusses in his article in this HSR Focus, the nuclear programs protest-
ers sought to stop were essentially controlled by national governments.  
Re-focusing from individual reactor projects to national nuclear programs 
changed anti-nuclear activism’s transnational resonance. While French politi-
cians and protesters from Luxembourg drew consequences from the site occu-
pation in Wyhl, it was harder for foreigners to identify with protests against the 
West German nuclear program in Bonn. Instead, the importance of national 
discourses became all the more apparent since disparate national contexts and 
agendas could not always be linked, as Astrid Mignon Kirchhof (2014) points 
out in her article in this HSR Focus. Whereas grassroots site occupations wel-
comed the participation of “the affected population,” however that population 
defined itself and wherever it happened to live, protests and electoral cam-
paigns intended to change national policy relied on people who – as citizens 
and voters – held the standing to do so. 
Nevertheless, there is another sense in which the story of the anti-nuclear 
movement – even within individual countries – must be told transnationally. 
After all, anti-nuclear activists remained well aware that the nuclear threat 
transcended national borders. Thus, despite their focus on individual national 
nuclear programs, they strived to frame their protests transnationally. Perhaps 
more importantly, however, activists also continued to work transnationally 
because they wanted to participate in the creation of a new, more democratic 
Europe. This new Europe was more than just an ideal to be striven towards, 
since events like the 1979 direct elections to the European Parliament appeared 
as fleeting – but very real – moments of transnational cooperation. In order to 
evaluate the significance of such transnationalism for the development of anti-
nuclear movements, this article will explore the ways in which activists in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) continued to think transnationally even 
after they moved their protests away from reactor construction sites and target-
ed their country’s nuclear program. I will focus here on the activist careers of 
Petra Kelly and Roland Vogt, who became involved in the anti-reactor protests 
of the mid-1970s and then played important roles in the founding of the West 
German Green Party. Members of the Young European Federalists since the 
early 1970s, Kelly and Vogt were both committed transnationalists even before 
they became actively involved in anti-nuclear activism. 
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The March 1979 founding of the Sonstige Politische Vereinigung: Die Grü-
nen (Alternative Political Organization: The Greens), which was specifically 
conceived as the vehicle for an alternative anti-nuclear campaign for seats in 
the European Parliament, is perhaps the best evidence of this enduring transna-
tional approach (Mende 2011). Using papers from the SPV Die Grünen’s Fed-
eral Board, as well as the correspondence of Kelly, Vogt, and other “founding 
Greens” (Mende 2011), I will look closely at this campaign and its effects. 
Almost paradoxically, as I will show in this article, what at first sight seemed to 
be an unmistakably European political undertaking may have had less reso-
nance across European borders than did many localized grassroots anti-reactor 
protests. In fact, from a material perspective, it was precisely the significant 
results of SPV Die Grünen’s campaign for the European parliament that fo-
cused its protagonists on domestic politics by enabling them to mount success-
ful campaigns for seats in West Germany’s federal and state parliaments. And 
yet, activists’ very focus on national electoral campaigns suggests a turn away 
from the transnationalism that had long defined anti-nuclear activism, even at 
the grassroots level. Thus, anti-nuclear activists’ struggles to think globally and 
to act meaningfully raise an important question about whether focused, local-
ized actions may actually have more powerful transnational effects than broad 
campaigns engineered with transnationalism in mind.  
2.  Local Occupation, Transnational Ramifications 
The Wyhl occupation has become by far the best known symbol of grassroots 
anti-nuclear protest in the FRG, yet describing it bedeviled its contemporaries 
and later scholars alike. Observers’ difficulty in describing “Wyhl” was already 
evident on the morning of 18 February 1975, when hundreds of local people, 
most of them women (Engels 2002) from nearby winegrowing villages, de-
scended on the reactor construction site and convinced work crews to put down 
their tools. Though these protesters had clearly taken over the site, the local 
press waffled as to whether or not their action marked the beginning of an 
occupation.5 Researchers have since shown that a great number of women were 
involved in the anti-nuclear movements in the FRG (Kirchhof 2013) and be-
yond (Wehr 1985; Adams 2002; Wittner 2003), but in 1975 rural women were 
not expected by their contemporaries to be involved in political protest. After 
all, middle-aged rural women looked nothing like the young, bearded student 
activists associated with public protest since 1968. Moreover, instead of calling 
for radical changes to society as a whole, the local people who spearheaded the 
protest at Wyhl were concerned about the future of their farms. Thus, this ac-
                                                             
5  Demonstranten erzwingen den Abbruch der Arbeit, Badische Zeitung, 19 February 1975. 
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tion and its protagonists simply did not match preconceived notions of who 
protesters were and how they went about their business.  
The important transnational dimension of the protest was also difficult for 
many observers to understand. French and Germans, who had long been la-
beled “hereditary enemies” (Lemettre 2009) by their governments, were work-
ing together against the reactor. Even if the 1962 Elysée Treaty had officially 
ended this longstanding enmity, local border crossings in the Upper Rhine 
valley still closed each night at 9pm in 1975, and transnational interaction 
remained rare amongst rural people in the region. For French who had survived 
the Nazi invasion and Germans who had lived through allied air raids, each trip 
across the river brought back shades of “a dark past in which we could not find 
a common way to benefit both the neighboring peoples” (Tittman 1976, 201). 
Yet at Wyhl, close cooperation across the river had brought protest strategies 
from the French Larzac into contact with scientific expertise from the nearby 
German university town of Freiburg. More importantly, cooperation allowed 
people from both sides of the Rhine to see themselves as a single community 
affected by the reactor project. 
Though it relied on Franco-German cooperation at the grassroots level, the 
occupation was steeped in specific, regional issues that were not particularly 
interesting to people away from the Rhine. Local farmers were concerned about 
the future of their valuable grape crops beneath the trailing clouds of steam a 
reactor would discharge. Yet unlike earlier protests in the region, which had 
included tractor parades, petition drives, and disruptions of licensing hearings, 
the physically-rooted occupation garnered attention all across Western Europe. 
Why did the occupation make what had long been a regional anti-reactor cam-
paign so significant to people so far from Wyhl? 
In the “leaden” 1970s,6 when opportunities for popular protest appeared 
greatly diminished, the occupation was a notable success. While the end of the 
student movement had caused some West German radicals to turn to terrorism, 
others to retreat into lifestyle politics, and still others to grudgingly join the 
governing SPD, many listless activists took an interest in anti-nuclear activism 
after they learned about the Wyhl occupation. Even before Wyhl, a writer for 
the anarchist graswurzelrevolution (grassroots revolution) had advocated “an 
ecology campaign” as a means of reactivating “unemployed” activists.7 After 
the occupation began, the monthly magazine reported constantly on the action 
at Wyhl. In the summer of 1977, members of the affiliated graswurzel-groups 
                                                             
6  On the idea of the 1970s as a “leaden” decade see Christiane Peitz, Die Bleikappe des 
Schweigens. Margarethe von Trotta über ihren Ensslin-Film, das Sympathisantentum und 
deutsche Kontinuitäten, Der Tagesspiegel, 28. April 2007. 
7  [Michael Schroeren], „Damit wir auch morgen noch kraftvoll zubeißen können…“ Notizen zu 
einer „Ökologie-Kampagne,“ graswurzelrevolution 7 (January 1974): 2. 
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initiated a short-lived occupation of their own at a reactor construction site in 
the German town of Grohnde near Hanover, the capital of Lower Saxony. 
The Kommunistische Volkszeitung, the official newspaper of the Communist 
League of West Germany (KBW), put the localized Wyhl occupation into 
particularly grand and universal terms. This action, the paper reported, “has 
inspired the masses throughout the country to take part in the struggle against 
the decisions of the state bureaucracy, which are directed against the people’s 
will.”8 Another Communist publication described the new grouping that had 
emerged at Wyhl as the vanguard of a, “solidary coalition of the millions of 
oppressed and exploited in our country,” who were engaged, “in a self-
conscious struggle against the capitalists and their state apparatus.”9 As this 
soaring prose indicated, Communists attributed a key role in the world proletar-
ian struggle to the fight over a single, small clearing in the Wyhl forest and thus 
tried to influence the Green movement early on, hoping to direct it in a clear 
Left or rather communist direction (Harney 2013). 
There was a grain of truth behind the KBW’s inflated rhetoric. During the 
second half of the seventies, anti-nuclear activism became a cause célèbre 
throughout Western Europe. Protesters attempted to occupy reactor construc-
tion sites all over West Germany and beyond. Wyhl was the initial, catalytic 
explosion in what Marie-Reine Haug had described as a chain reaction of pro-
tests. Though protesters at Wyhl relied on transnational cooperation at the 
grassroots level, and though they quickly amended their slogan from “No Reac-
tor at Wyhl” to “No Reactor at Wyhl… or Anywhere Else,” the occupation’s 
translocal salience was largely attributed to it by outside observers. Nor did this 
geographic broadening of the Wyhl struggle’s significance stop at the West 
German border. Transnationally motivated activists, like the members of the 
Brussels-based European socialist network agenor, focused on constructing 
Wyhl as a tool for their activist project (Meyer 2013). In their journal, agenor, 
they summarized and translated information about the events, strategies and 
activist groups at Wyhl.10 They also published grassroots anti-nuclear activists’ 
contact information and encouraged connections across borders. Distributed 
throughout Western Europe, agenor contributed to Wyhl’s growing stature as 
an important example of transnational anti-nuclear protest. 
The key to the Wyhl occupation’s translocal salience, therefore, lies in the 
way it was interpreted by different people and groups. In this sense, the occu-
pation reveals how local action could inspire global change. Outsiders like the 
graswurzel-groups and the KBW re-cast the grassroots anti-reactor campaign 
                                                             
8  Die Kämpfe in Wyhl haben die Volksmasse im ganzen Land ermutigt, Kommunistische 
Volkszeitung 3, No. 15/16 (April 1975): 9. 
9  KPD Regional Komitee Baden-Württemberg, “Kein KKW in Wyhl” (23 February 1975). Archiv 
Soziale Bewegungen Freiburg (hereafter: ASB), Doc No. 3599. 
10  Nuclear Power Stop. Wyhl, Brokdorf, Malville, agenor.options for the left 65 (May 1977). 
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as one small, unique, and authentic part of a larger social movement, comprised 
of numerous localized, specific actions. Such actions, outsiders had come to 
realize, were effective precisely because of their rootedness and the local popu-
lation’s deep-seated support for them. It was this efficacy that protesters hoped 
to maintain after they left the site. Yet, these outside activists who promoted 
the struggle at Wyhl as a new transnational political model were also dedicated 
to creating a more widespread activist movement that could affect broad social 
change. The tension between grassroots activism and transnational aspirations 
dominated their efforts as they sought to build on the “example of Wyhl.”11 
3.  The End of the Movement as They Knew It 
As the Wyhl occupation became known across Europe and beyond, anti-
nuclear activists elsewhere sought to recreate it – even on the other side of the 
Atlantic, as the article by Michael L. Hughes (2014) in this HSR Focus demon-
strates. Government officials and police chiefs also learned from Wyhl, howev-
er. They developed new strategies to protect reactor sites. The result of these 
parallel learning processes was a string of increasingly violent confrontations 
between anti-nuclear activists and the police along the perimeters reactor con-
struction sites in late 1976 and 1977. None of these mass protests resulted in a 
lasting occupation, and protesters were almost always kept off of fortified 
reactor sites altogether by well-armed police. Undeterred by previous failures, 
60,000 anti-nuclear activists from all across Western Europe made their way to 
the village of Malville in Southern France in July 1977 in an attempt to occupy 
the “Super-Phénix” Fast Breeder Reactor construction site. The French gov-
ernment had sent five-thousand troops equipped with grenades, tear gas, heli-
copters, and amphibious vehicles to defend the prestigious project. In the ensu-
ing battle, one protester was killed and several lost limbs. Hundreds more were 
injured (Mossmann 2009, 245). 
The bitter violence at Malville did irreparable damage to the image of site 
occupation and raised questions about the anti-nuclear movement as a whole 
(Kitschelt 1984, 75; Aldrich 2008, 152-3). In the wake of Malville, Dieter 
Rucht has written, the French anti-nuclear movement “became disoriented and 
lost much of its credibility in the minds of the public” (Rucht 1994, 130). Alain 
Touraine considered the battle at Malville to have been even more damning for 
the movement. The failed protest, he wrote, “demonstrated the inability of the 
anti-nuclear current to organize itself into a political force” (Tourraine 1983, 
28). The French government was all too eager to make use of this opportunity 
                                                             
11  Freia Hoffmann, “Was bedeutet das Beispiel Wyhl?” (Freiburg: 21 March 1975). Archiv 
Grünes Gedächtnis (hereafter: AGG) Petra Kelly Archiv (hereafter: PKA) 2264. 
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to attack the anti-nuclear movement. By blaming German radicals for the vio-
lence, French officials exonerated French protesters and thus threatened their 
transnational cooperation. In short, the epic failure at Malville raised serious 
questions about the ability of localized action to foster global change. 
In West Germany, activists were already searching for a means of organiz-
ing themselves into a more potent, translocal political force by the time of the 
Malville debacle. In May 1977, reactor opponents heatedly debated how they 
might organize themselves at the first Federal Congress of Reactor Opponents 
in Hanover.12 This attempt, unfortunately, fell flat. The agenda was dominated 
by theoretical resolutions put forward by representatives of Communist splinter 
groups. Delegates of grassroots anti-reactor groups exited the meeting in 
droves.13 The magazine Atom-Express, published by an anti-nuclear protest 
group from Göttingen, did not even bother “detailing the many resolutions, 
since they will have no effect on the further struggle against reactors.” Instead, 
the anti-nuclear publication simply concluded that, “this Federal Conference 
was no step forward” for the movement (Paul 1997, 57-8).14 
Yet, the meeting accomplished more than Atom-Express’ dispirited report 
acknowledged. Held shortly after Lower Saxony’s Christian Democratic Prem-
ier Ernst Albrecht named rural Gorleben as the future site of a nuclear waste 
processing and storage facility, the Federal Conference brought together dele-
gates from more than 256 anti-nuclear initiatives in Lower Saxony’s capital 
city. This was no coincidence. Focus on the proposed nuclear waste facility 
offered West German activists an opportunity to go beyond localized anti-
reactor struggles and to centralize their movement. Without Gorleben, after all, 
each of the Federal Republic’s dozen reactors would have nowhere to send its 
radioactive waste and thus, eventually, become inoperable. Moreover, the 
debacle at Malville and the pall cast over the FRG by terrorist violence of the 
Red Army Faction (RAF) during the “German autumn” (Varon 2004; Aust 
2008) only reinforced reactor opponents’ desire to find a means of affecting 
change that could not be so readily dismissed as violent. Gorleben offered an 
opportunity to give the movement a new direction. 
Nevertheless, finding a means of working against the Gorleben facility chal-
lenged anti-nuclear activists. Tensions developed at future Federal Conferences 
between local people who wanted to protest at the rural site and representatives 
of groups from across the Federal Republic who wanted centralized rallies. In 
1979, the factions compromised by calling for three separate actions. First, they 
organized a week-long farmers’ trek from Gorleben to Hanover for March 
1979. By the time the Gorleben farmers reached the state capital, they would be 
                                                             
12  Bundeskongreß der Bürgerinitiativen, Arbeiterkampf 104 (16 May 1977). 
13  Nach der Bundeskonferenz: Es brodelt in der Gerüchte-Küche, Arbeiterkampf 105 (31 May 
1977). 
14  Bundeskonferenz 14. 15. Mai 77, Atom-Express 2 (June/July 1977): 23. 
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joined by anti-nuclear activists from across the FRG for a mass rally and a 
hearing on the Gorleben project. Second, in deference to local people, they 
called for a national protest to be held in Gorleben three weeks after preparato-
ry work began on the site. Finally, they planned a mass rally to be held at the 
Bonner Hofgarten – a park in front of the elector’s palace in the city center of 
the federal capital of Germany – in the fall.  
The Hofgarten rally, which took place in October 1979, was the largest pro-
test the Federal Republic had ever seen. The symbolism of both the Gorleben 
trek and the Hofgarten rally was clear. In their attempts to organize themselves 
into a powerful political force, anti-nuclear activists were – unsurprisingly – 
targeting the powerful people who set the FRG’s nuclear policy. Unlike site 
occupations, which empowered people at the local level, and were only loosely 
linked with national politics, rallies in centers of government called on policy 
makers to change nuclear programs in specific ways. Though they were cen-
trally organized and all comers were welcome to participate, such protests 
lacked the openness to the transnational imaginary that had made localized site 
occupations so transnationally potent. 
4.   Off the Site and into the System 
Centralized rallies were not reactor opponents’ only response to the delegitimi-
zation of site occupation. Even as the Federal Congress of Reactor Opponents 
met in Hanover in 1977, a 36-year old state attorney named Carl Beddermann 
was discussing his plans for a new political party with other members of the 
anti-nuclear citizens’ initiative in nearby Schwarmstedt. Like many other reac-
tor opponents, Beddermann had been deeply frustrated by the violent occupa-
tion attempts of 1977. He felt that the movement was “being discredited by the 
big police interventions” and was not making any headway towards stopping 
the proliferation of nuclear technology (Hallensleben 1984, 50). Concerned that 
an occupation attempt would not stop the Gorleben project, and inspired by 
French ecologists who had just run candidates in the March 1977 municipal 
elections, Beddermann (1978) proposed the creation of an environmental party 
that soon became the Green List for Environmental Protection (Grüne Liste 
Umweltschutz – GLU). 
Even if the idea of a Green party had originated across the border in France, 
German reactor opponents’ newfound interest in electoral politics seemed to 
suggest a step away from transnationalism and towards national politics. Yet, 
proposals for direct elections to the European Parliament, which were initially 
expected to be held in May 1978, offered anti-nuclear activists an opportunity 
to bring their transnational vision into the electoral arena. Accordingly, the 
West German hosts opened an August 1977 international seminar in Bergisch-
Gladbach by imploring delegates from ten western European countries that: 
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It must be our task, indeed our duty, to draft an environmental program for the 
elections to the European parliament, to present it to the public, and to debate 
these issues with those who will carry out European politics. We must be there 
when it is time to build the Europe of the future (Schumacher 1978, 60). 
To this end, West Germany’s Federal Association of Citizens’ Initiatives for 
Environmental Protection voted in November 1977 to draw up a list of candi-
dates in order to participate in the European elections. The group’s chairman, 
Hans Günter Schumacher, viewed the vote as a “decisive contribution to the 
solidarization of all environmentalists in Europe” (Schumacher 1978, 61). 
According to Schumacher, at least, electoral politics had significant transna-
tional potential. 
Yet, the European elections did not come as planned in May 1978. Instead 
of running for the European Parliament, therefore, several members of the 
BBU’s Federal Board served as candidates the following month in state elec-
tions in Hamburg and Lower Saxony. In the Lower Saxony elections, which 
were contested by Beddermann’s GLU, environmentalist candidates scored an 
impressive 3.9% of the statewide vote and notched particular successes of 
between five and six percent near reactor sites. In Gorleben, the new party 
received a remarkable 17.8% of the vote (Hallensleben 1984, 98). In both 
states, the new Green lists made an impact on the composition of the state 
parliaments. Since Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s (1995, 125-38; Mencke-Glückert 
1997) liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) had developed an environmental 
program in 1971 and presented itself as the party of the environment (Bun-
desregierung 1973; Uekötter 2011, 92), the Green Lists’ participation in state 
elections cost the FDP crucial votes and contributed to its inability to jump the 
“5% hurdle,” the minimum threshold of the vote necessary to win seats in 
parliament, in Hamburg and Lower Saxony. Electoral politics seemed capable 
of both knitting together activism at disparate reactor sites and also enabling 
activists to affect the composition of parliaments. 
The GLU’s success in Lower Saxony helped launch or invigorate environ-
mental parties in many West German states. In Hesse, four separate Green 
parties prepared to compete in the October 1978 state parliament elections. In 
an attempt to prevent rival environmental parties from “competing for the 
pleasure of the three major parties and preventing each other from making a 
political breakthrough,” the “Democratic Movement for the Protection of Life” 
(Demokratische Lebenschutzbewegung – DLB) called a “Strategy meeting” in 
Darmstadt.15 Intended to bring together these disparate Green factions, the 
Darmstadt strategy session led to a larger “German Environmental Meeting,” 
which was held in June 1978 at the village of Troisdorf, near Bonn.  
                                                             
15  Gisela Dick (Demokratische Lebenschutzbewegung), “Liebe Freunde!” (28 December 1977). 
AGG Kerschgens 6. 
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The Troisdorf meeting was caught between the Greens’ initial successes at 
the state level and their European aspirations. Its organizers explained that they 
hoped to bring together enough of “the ecological movements of EUROPE” to 
ensure that “they will see us and hear us [ten kilometers away] in Bonn.”16 
Only a handful of activists from outside the Federal Republic traveled to 
Troisdorf, however. Among them was Petra Kelly. A native Bavarian who had 
grown up in the United States, Kelly lived in Brussels and worked as an official 
for the Economic and Social Committee of the European Economic Communi-
ties (Milder 2010). Her hopes for the meeting were clear. With her European 
Federalist colleague Roland Vogt, Kelly had already published an article de-
scribing her desire for a transnationally coordinated Green campaign to take 
part in the European parliamentary elections. She believed that such an effort 
could be made into a “decisive battle against nuclear reactors.”17  
In a series of meetings over the following nine months, a Coordinating 
Committee elected at Troisdorf worked towards the creation of “uniform insti-
tutions in the German federal states and on the European level.”18 Beyond 
Kelly and the Viennese Social Democrat Paul Blau, however, the committee 
was comprised solely of inhabitants of the Federal Republic. Thus, while state 
level Green organizations were being formed across the FRG during the winter 
of 1978-1979, the Coordinating Committee was unable to spur the creation of 
equivalent groupings abroad. Moreover, Kelly and Blau remained its only 
significant contacts to homegrown environmental organizations in other coun-
tries. Even Kelly’s ardent transnationalism was not enough to create a truly 
European campaign for the European Parliament. 
Despite its lack of bona fide connections across West Germany’s borders, 
however, the Coordinating Committee continued to think in European terms. In 
February 1979, it heard a presentation on “European Currency Policy and the 
Political Ecology Movement” before formally voting to convene a founding 
conference for a political organization that would run candidates in the elec-
tions to the European Parliament, which had finally been scheduled for June 
1979.19 The campaign itself appeared to offer broad vistas for international 
work. The 81 Germans elected to the Parliament would serve alongside 329 
                                                             
16  Deutsches Umwelttreffen 1978, “Die Stunde ist reif für ein großes Umwelttreffen!” AGG 
Kerschgens 6. 
17  Petra Kelly and Roland Vogt, Ökologie und Frieden. Der Kampf gegen Atomkraftwerke aus 
der Sicht von Hiroshima, Forum Europa (January/February 1977): 15 – 18. 
18  Koordinierungsausschuß des Deutschen Umwelttreffens, “Ergebnisse der Besprechung vom 
9./10. September in Vlotho.” AGG Kerschgens 6. 
19  Koordinierungsausschuß des deutschen Umwelttreffens, “Einladung zum dritten Treffen im 
Collegium Humanum, Akademie für Umwelt- und Lebensschutz in Vlotho/Valdorf.” AGG 
Kerschgens 6. Kelly and Blau were also invited to address European topics at the meeting. 
See: “Protokoll der 2. Sitzung des Bundeskoordinierungsausschusses (BKA) des Deutschen 
Umwelttreffens in Troisdorf,”. AGG Kerschgens 6. 
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members from the eight other EEC member states. Moreover, ecology parties 
were also contesting the election in France, Belgium, and the UK. Kelly, Vogt, 
and other transnationally-minded campaigners with European contacts envi-
sioned a parliamentary caucus comprised of these ecologists as well as the 
Dutch and Italian Radical parties in Strasbourg.  
Like the mass rallies in Hanover and Bonn, electoral politics brought new 
hope to anti-nuclear activists in the late seventies. The Greens’ initial successes 
in state-level elections offered the potential to shape policy at that level, but the 
European elections seemed particularly well-suited to anti-nuclear activists’ 
political outlook and aspirations. Long before the date for the elections had 
even been set, environmentalists saw them as a unique opportunity to continue 
working in the same transnational manner that local anti-reactor protests had. 
The short European campaign, which was to begin in the FRG with the found-
ing of SPV Die Grünen in March 1979 and end with the 10 June election, 
would reveal whether West German activists could use such an opportunity to 
cooperate across Europe’s many borders and engineer a new transnational 
politics. 
5.  The Campaign for the European Parliament: Trans-
nationalism in Practice? 
Petra Kelly was particularly excited to take up the challenge of creating a new 
Europe on the basis of an anti-nuclear campaign for the European Parliament. 
In an ebullient March 1979 letter she informed friends and political colleagues 
across Europe that she had been elected to the “number one” position on the 
German Greens’ list of candidates for the European Parliament. She sought 
“help and ideas and financial support” so that she could “speak up for a decen-
tralised, non-nuclear, non-military and gentle Europe – a Europe of the Regions 
and of the People.”20 As the Greens’ lead candidate, Kelly appeared to be in the 
position to make her transnational dreams for a more-integrated, non-nuclear 
Europe the focal point of the campaign.  
Like Kelly, members of Hamburg’s Grüne Liste Umweltschutz (GLU), one 
of the many small ecological parties that comprised SPV Die Grünen, linked 
together anti-nuclear activism and dreams for European integration in order to 
describe the transnational potential of Green politics. “For ecological forces,” 
wrote Heinz Böhmecke of the Hamburg GLU, “there are no arbitrary bounda-
ries. [Ecologists] feel themselves responsible for all of Europe.” He went on to 
compare Gorleben to the French reprocessing center in La Hague and its Brit-
ish counterpart at Windscale. Ecologists could not allow any of these sites – 
                                                             
20  Petra Kelly to Friends and Comrades (24 March 1979). AGG PKA 540,6. 
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nor “any other place on the planet” – to become “the radioactively poisoned 
heart of Europe.”21 Like Kelly, Böhmecke clearly considered environmental 
politics and anti-nuclear activism to be inherently transnational. The elections 
to the European Parliament seemed a tailor-made opportunity for the nascent 
German Green party to move beyond the arbitrary boundaries of national poli-
tics and to foster change across the continent. 
Not everyone in SPV Die Grünen saw the campaign for the European Par-
liament as such an exciting opportunity, however. Karl Kerschgens sent a letter 
to fellow Greens in Hesse explaining that he understood their unease about the 
unusual campaign. “Many of us,” he wrote, “needed to give ourselves a little 
push in order to get going despite the general disinclination towards the Euro-
pean elections.” Yet, Kerschgens reasoned, “If we want to have a meaningful 
campaign in the next Bundestag election, then we need to get every possible 
vote this time around.”22 Other leading Greens echoed the idea that the Europe-
an campaign was really just a dress rehearsal for the 1980 Bundestag elections. 
Helmut Lippelt, for example, described the process of drafting a program for 
the European elections as a valuable opportunity to begin hashing out the par-
ty’s federal election program a year early.23 The fact that the West German 
government would reimburse each political party 1.40 DM per vote received in 
the European election reinforced the idea that the campaign was an important 
step in the Greens’ preparations for the 1980 Bundestag elections. 
The shape that the European campaign took belied these divergent concep-
tions of it. In early 1979, representatives of the various minor parties and 
groupings that comprised the Alternative Political Association got together to 
begin the arduous work of drafting an election program that met its disparate 
membership’s approval. Kelly, who was in the midst of a campaign swing 
through “Kiel, Gorleben, Nijmegen, Nuremburg, Brussels, Deggendorf, Passau, 
etc.” and thus could not attend the deliberations, sent a perturbed letter to party 
headquarters. She called on the Greens to use a set of points that she and Ro-
land Vogt had developed, and which she had already translated into English, as 
the basis for the program. After all, Kelly informed the program’s framers: 
At the international level we simply must have platform points that everyone 
can accept. The ones Roland and I have worked out are in agreement with 
those of the French, the Dutch, and the Italians.24 
                                                             
21  Heinz Böhmecke, “Antrag an die Europaprogramm-Kommission,” 4 March 1979. AGG 
Kerschgens 10. 
22  Kerschgens to “Friends in the green and alternative movement” (6 May 1979). AGG Kersch-
gens 10. 
23  Helmut Lippelt to the Members of the Program Committee (9 January 1979). AGG Kersch-
gens 10. 
24  Petra Kelly to Vorstand “Der Grünen” (undated). AGG PKA 2552. 
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Kelly’s perception of which “everyone” had to accept the program was plainly 
different from that of other leading German Greens. One of the key decisions 
facing SPV Die Grünen, therefore, was whether it was responsible to the di-
verse spectrum of German environmental groups that comprised it, in a bottom-
up manner, or whether it ought to be in agreement with the other Green and 
Radical parties of Europe, in the spirit of transnational coordination, as Kelly 
suggested.  
Given the enormous influence of Kelly and Vogt – who together made more 
than fifty stump speeches, coordinated the party’s media outreach, and man-
aged its Bonn office alongside numerous other responsibilities – one might 
expect that their perception of a transnationally coordinated European cam-
paign won out.25 But matters beyond their control forced the campaign to re-
main in many ways a specifically West German undertaking. When the Euro-
pean Community’s Council of Ministers eventually mandated that direct 
elections to the European Parliament be held in June 1979, it soothed the more 
skeptical governments by leaving it up to the member states to set the electoral 
rules (Morgan and Allen 1978; Rittberger 2007). Hence, with only a few modi-
fications and exceptions, the Federal Republic’s standard electoral laws gov-
erned the Greens’ campaign.  
As long as national governments retained their power to set the election’s 
rules, transnationalists’ visions for the European election were unlikely to be 
implemented. Along with other ardent European Federalists Kelly had long 
advocated transnational election districts, for example. Yet, the EC member 
states’ governments made no move to organize such districts prior to the 1979 
campaign. Thus, in order to win seats in the European parliament, the Greens 
would have to solicit votes within the Federal Republic. Though German can-
didates like Kelly and Vogt could (and did) campaign in support of Green 
candidates in France, French voters would not have the option of voting for the 
German Green List. Thus, if the German Greens wished to gain seats in Stras-
bourg – and, importantly, to receive campaign cost reimbursement funds from 
the German government, which were apportioned on the basis of votes received 
– they would have to organize a more traditional, national campaign.  
Thus, although it was aimed at winning seats in Strasbourg, the German 
Greens’ campaign for the European Parliament, quickly adapted itself to the 
established framework of West German political praxis. It concluded – as the 
major parties’ Bundestag campaigns typically did – at party headquarters in 
Bonn.26 As he watched the results come in from across the Federal Republic, 
Vogt was quick to point out that had the so-called “five percent hurdle” not 
been in place, the “formidable” 3.2% of the vote that SPV Die Grünen had 
                                                             
25  Roland Vogt, “Bericht zur Bundesgeschäftsstelle” (undated; presumably June/July 1979). 
AGG PKA 2553. 
26  Petra Kelly and Dorothea Wieczorek, “Einladung” (6 June 1979). AGG Kerschgens 10. 
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received would have entitled both Kelly and himself to seats in Strasbourg. Yet 
Vogt assessed the campaign’s results beyond West Germany’s borders, too. 
Counting ecologically-minded MPs from Italy, Holland, and Denmark, as well 
as the three French Ecologists who would have won seats without their own 
country’s five percent hurdle, Vogt reckoned that a Green delegation of “cer-
tainly more than ten representatives” ought to be on its way to Strasbourg.27 In 
reality, of course, no German Greens or French Ecologists would be seated in 
the European parliament. Vogt’s imagined transnational Green caucus would 
not even begin to materialize until the German Greens won seats in Strasbourg 
in 1984. 
Despite setbacks imposed by national electoral law and the extent to which 
the Green campaign had adapted itself to West German electoral praxis, a 
European outlook continued to shape Vogt and Kelly’s responses to the cam-
paign. Together with representatives of Europe’s other ecological parties, the 
pair planned a demonstration that would take place as the parliament convened 
on 17 July. Five-hundred Greens from across Europe marched through Stras-
bourg’s streets in a procession that evidenced Petra Kelly’s love of symbolic 
action and clearly foreshadowed the German Greens’ triumphant march 
through Bonn and into the Bundestag four years later (Richter 2010, 245-7, 
253). Prevented from taking seats in parliament, Kelly and Vogt unfurled a 
banner protesting the “undemocratic and anti-European five percent hurdle” 
from the spectators’ balcony and were promptly ejected from the opening cer-
emonies. The duo sought a legal remedy next, bringing an unsuccessful chal-
lenge to the German constitutional court before investigating their options at 
the European Court of Justice. 
When SPV Die Grünen’s Federal Board met in Kassel five days after the 
election, Kelly and Vogt continued their push for transnationalism. They con-
vinced the Board to use campaign reimbursement funds supplied by the West 
German government to bail out the heavily indebted French Ecology party. 
They also solicited support for a Greens’ European office in Strasbourg, which 
Kelly estimated would require one million DM of funding over the next five 
years.28 The next edition of the party newsletter evidenced the success of Kelly 
and Vogt’s efforts, trumpeting the German Greens’ support for their French 
allies and devoting attention to the transnational protest that environmentalists 
had staged as the European Parliament convened.29 Meanwhile, Kelly was 
dispatched to Strasbourg with a check for the French Ecologists and orders to 
find a suitable site for a European office. By the fall of 1979, office space had 
been rented near the European Parliament and Roland Vogt remained on the 
                                                             
27  Stellungnahme von Roland Vogt zum Wahlergebnis, die tageszeitung (12 June 1979): 1. 
28  Petra K. Kelly, “Vorschlag für ein europäisches Aktions/Informationsbüro in Strassburg oder 
Brüssel,” AGG Ba-Wü 109. 
29  Lukas Beckmann and Otto Fanger, “Rundbrief” (August 1979). AGG Kerschgens 10. 
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German Greens’ payroll as Strasbourg office manager. Kelly was back in Brus-
sels, working at the EEC and organizing European contacts for the party.30 By 
dedicating the resources they had received from the West German government 
to European ends, the Greens seemed to have found a workable means of main-
taining – if not bolstering – their transnationalism. 
Yet, Vogt and Kelly were not the only Greens who had ideas for the party’s 
next steps. Urgent letters sent to the Federal Board from Bremen requested an 
advance on electoral reimbursement funds owed to that state’s Green List. The 
upcoming elections in the Hanseatic city-state, leaders of the Bremen Green 
List argued, presented an opportunity for the party as a whole.31 Georg Otto, a 
co-founder of the GLU, who had been hired by the Greens’ Federal Board to 
help prepare the party for the 1980 Bundestag Elections, acknowledged the 
“trendsetting function” of the Bremen election and called for “federal solidarity 
with the Bremen Green list.”32 Though no one demanded that support for the 
Bremen Greens be drawn from funds intended for European work, Otto’s char-
acterization of the Bremen election as a “trendsetter” suggested that the Ger-
man Greens’ Federal Board saw the opportunity to win seats in Bremen’s state 
parliament as a more productive means of pursuing Green political goals than 
emphasizing transnational, European work. 
From southern Germany came another reason for the Greens to focus on 
domestic politics. Activists in both Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria planned to 
formally organize state branches of the new party in the fall. The Federal Board 
was concerned that “loopholes” in the temporary bylaws of SPV Die Grünen, 
which had been specially created to contest the European elections, would 
prevent these proposed southern German state chapters from formally joining 
the organization. As a result, the Board voted unanimously to disband the 
“Special Political Association” and found a new federal party in the fall.33 
After the Greens won seats in the state parliaments of Bremen in October 
1979 and Baden-Württemberg in March 1980, their focus on campaigning 
within the Federal Republic only intensified. Bundestag elections were sched-
uled for October 1980 and each German state would hold statewide and munic-
ipal elections at least once in the five-year interval before the next European 
parliamentary election. Even the most transnationally-minded Greens returned 
to the FRG in order to participate in domestic elections and party-building. In 
1981, Roland Vogt left Strasbourg to take a seat on the Greens’ Federal Board. 
Petra Kelly took another leave of absence from the EEC and returned to Ger-
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PKA 2553. 
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many from Brussels in order to serve as the Greens’ lead candidate in the 1980 
Bundestag campaign, the 1982 campaign for the Bavarian Parliament, and 
finally the successful 1983 Bundestag campaign.  
Despite her endless campaigning, Kelly continued to speak of the primacy 
of “questions of global survival” that transcended national borders and were 
decided outside of parliament by groups like “the armaments lobby.” Neverthe-
less, she explained that she was firmly committed to domestic electoral cam-
paigns due to her belief that for the Greens, parliament was “a site…where we 
can speak, where we can bring our positions in and carry information out.”34 
The distinction between national and transnational approaches to anti-nuclear 
activism and environmental politics was now clearer than ever. Transnational-
ly-minded Greens like Kelly continued to talk about anti-nuclear activism as a 
European project, but emphasizing electoral campaigns pushed the party ever 
further from the sort of open-ended transnational connections and global think-
ing that had excited Greens about the upcoming European elections during the 
late 1970s. In fact, the combination of the German Greens’ successes and the 
setbacks faced by the French and British Ecologists made it even more difficult 
to effectively conduct Green politics across Europe’s borders.  
6.  Conclusion 
Despite the German Greens’ growing focus on domestic electoral campaigning 
after the 1979 European elections, thinking beyond the nation-state remained 
important for proponents of Green politics and anti-nuclear activists. The 
French and British Greens won their first nationally contested seats in elections 
to the European Parliament in 1989 and 1999 respectively. In Britain, the 
Green breakthrough finally came only after the law governing elections to the 
European parliament was changed to allow for proportional representation. 
This targeted reform, which did not apply to elections to the British parliament, 
reinforces the idea that Europe could be a site of real democratic experimenta-
tion at the same time as it embodied anti-nuclear activists’ most radical aspira-
tions for a new society. 
Indeed, the practical significance of Europe for the Greens and for anti-
nuclear activists remained very clear during the 1970s and 1980s. In addition to 
the continuing significance of the European Parliament as an electoral stepping 
stone, Jan-Henrik Meyer (2013) has shown that non-partisan anti-nuclear activ-
ists worked to create effective lobbying organizations in Brussels. Environmen-
talists also continued to emphasize the transnational effects of environmental 
                                                             
34  Spiegel Gespräch. “Wir sind die Antipartei-Partei.” Petra Kelly über die politische Strategie 
der Grünen, Der Spiegel 24 (1982): 47-56. 
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disasters. The sheer absurdity of the French government’s insistence that fall-
out from the 1986 Chernobyl meltdown stopped at the Rhine (Kalmbach 2011, 
chapter 4) only reinforced the obvious fact that the nuclear threat was particu-
larly transnational.  
Yet by the mid-1980s, a European perspective no longer seemed to shape 
the aspirations of Green politics in the way that leading Greens had argued that 
it must in the late 1970s. The sort of popular transnationalism that had captured 
Europeans’ imaginations and thus made localized site occupations meaningful 
across broad swathes of territory during the 1970s proved elusive after envi-
ronmental protests were re-directed to capital cities and parliamentary elec-
tions. Even the idea that transnationally-framed protests and participation in 
elections to the European parliament were a means of shaping a new, more 
democratic Europe was fading from view. Instead, the focus was on navigating 
each country’s electoral law and gaining influence within each nation-state’s 
existing political system. 
The more that anti-nuclear activists sought to grow their movement beyond 
individual anti-reactor struggles and to shape nuclear policy, therefore, the 
more that their work lost its connection to the vision of creating a new and 
radically transnational Europe. Significant numbers of Europeans adopted 
environmental values, but as Michael Bess (2003) has shown in the case of 
France, the “light Green” societies that have emerged in Europe function so 
well because they incorporate a less radical form of environmentalism into 
everyday life. This normalization of environmental values is a stunning 
achievement in and of itself, but it is far short of the sort of the potential for the 
global transformation of politics and even humanity that some activists found 
in localized anti-reactor protests and linked to the forging of a new, more dem-
ocratic Europe. 
There is no question, however, that anti-nuclear activists’ early transnational 
dreams and the headline-grabbing site occupations of the mid-seventies shaped 
the changes that took place throughout the continent. The excitement generated 
by far-flung and “unprecedented” rural reactor site occupations gives credence 
to the idea that localized action can – and frequently does – have global ramifi-
cations. Though the nitty-gritty work of changing policy relies on actions that 
function within the framework of politics as usual, localized protests can raise 
awareness and change the way people think across all sorts of boundaries. 
Truly understanding the rise of anti-nuclear politics in Western Europe and the 
potential that its proponents attributed to it, therefore, requires scholars to take 
very seriously the transnational ramifications of disparate local actions. Though 
the anti-nuclear movement later took on unique national trajectories, these 
early protests, which relied on transnational cooperation and inspired people 
across national borders, made nuclear energy a significant issue across Western 
Europe and linked this issue itself to the idea of a new Europe. The anti-nuclear 
movement’s development from the local to the transnational to the national 
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level, therefore, is not so much a story of politics dictated by “opportunity 
structures” as it is an explanation of how anti-nuclear activists’ local actions 
and transnational aspirations fell short of forging a new Europe, but created 
important new opportunities to reshape national politics. 
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